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THE NEW RELIGION
MICHAEL J.

GERHARDTt

INTRODUCTION
In 2006, one chapter in the history of the Supreme Court came to
a close, and a new one began. The Senate's confirmation of Samuel
Alito, Jr., as the Supreme Court's 110th justice, signaled the formal
end to the nearly twenty-five-year-long tenure of the first woman appointed to the Court, Sandra Day O'Connor. Justice Alito's appointment further marked the end to the second longest period in our
nation's history without a vacancy arising on the Court. With Justice
Alito's confirmation, Justice Stephen Breyer fell a couple months shy
of the record for the longest serving junior justice in American history.
The appointments of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito also
marked the first time since 1971 that two new justices joined the
Court during the same Term.
My objective in this Essay is to explore the ramifications of these
historic developments for the Supreme Court and particularly the judicial selection process. Initially, I will examine what was distinctive
about President George W. Bush's Supreme Court nominations and
the confirmation proceedings for those nominations. Many people
worry that the confirmation process for Supreme Court nominations is
broken and cite the Senate's rejection of Robert Bork's nomination to
the Court as the watershed event signaling the demise of the confirmation process. Some people undoubtedly saw the confirmation proceedings for Roberts and Alito as restoring the Supreme Court
selection process to proper working order. I will explain why I am
skeptical that the proceedings marked a return of the process to what
it had been during some previous supposedly golden era. While there
was much to admire about the nominations of Roberts and Alito and
the Senate's proceedings on those nominations, I remain concerned
that a serious problem throughout the hearings was a disturbing, persistent lack of candor.
The Supreme Court confirmation process cannot be fixed - if fixed
it need be - or even improved, as long as obfuscation and veiled rhetoric are encouraged and rewarded. I do not think the process is broken.
t Samuel Ashe Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law & Director of the
UNC Center on Law & Government. This Essay is an expanded version of the TePoel
Lecture I delivered at Creighton University School of Law. I am grateful to Professor G.
Michael Fenner and the Creighton Law Review for invaluable support throughout this
project.
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It still largely functions as designed by inviting conflict or accommodation between the branches and even within the Senate and by subjecting the operations of the process to public scrutiny. But lack of candor
does not make the process work better; it makes the process more
frustrating. The confirmation process works best when it functions
transparently and all parties may be held accountable for what they
say and do.
I.

WHY THE ROBERTS AND ALITO CONFIRMATION
PROCEEDINGS WERE DISTINCTIVE

The confirmation proceedings for Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito were distinctive in at least three major respects. First, the
proceedings were distinctive for the new rhetoric employed for describing proper judging. Chief Justice Roberts did not speak of judging in
traditional terms. Instead, he used simple, colloquial, politically appealing language to describe his understanding of what judges should
do. He suggested that a justice ought to act with "modesty"1 and that
judging was analogous to "umpiring."2 He characterized himself as
committed to "bottom-up" rather than "top-down" judging. 3 He was
careful not to explain these references in any significant detail, and
many senators followed suit. Senators supporting his nomination
spoke admiringly of his intellectual abilities and academic achievements, his distinguished record of Supreme Court advocacy, and his
"heart."4 More than a few senators (and commentators) were dazzled
by his eloquence, confidence, and endurance as a witness before the
Judiciary Committee. 5 Similarly, Justice Alito avoided detailed discussions of his judicial philosophy. He spoke largely in platitudes
6
about how he would perform his duties as a Supreme Court justice,
1. Mike Allen and R. Jeffrey Smith, Judges Should Have 'Limited'Role, Roberts
Says; Statement to Panel Cites Need for Restraint on Bench; PriorDocuments Question
'Right to Privacy',WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2005, at A5 ("Roberts wrote in his statement to

the committee that the proper exercise of the judicial role 'in our constitutional system
requires a degree of institutional and personal modesty and humility' and said it is 'not
part of the judicial function to make the law.'").

2. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary United
States Senate, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) [hereinafter Roberts Confirmation Hearing](state-

ment of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States).
3. See id. at 159 (testimony of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of
the United States).
4. See id. at 53-54, 346 (statements of Sen. John Warner and Sen. Mike DeWine).
5.

Marcia Davis, The Unheard; On the FirstDay, John Roberts's Reserve is Con-

firmed, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2005, at Cl; John Hinderaker and Paul Mirengoff, Why
Alito's the Man for the True Conservative Agenda, WASH. POST,Nov. 6, 2005, at B3.
6. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: HearingBefore the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, 109th Cong. 593 (2006) [hereinafter Alito
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and senators supporting his nomination emphasized his "heart," bipartisan accolades from his fellow judges and former law clerks, and
7
his character.
Second, John Roberts made history more than once during the
summer and fall of 2005. He is the only person ever nominated for
each of two concurrent vacancies on the Court. Recall that the Senate
Judiciary Committee was just about to start its proceedings on Roberts' nomination as an Associate Justice when President Bush nominated him to replace Chief Justice William Rehnquist. (Had
Rehnquist lived and Roberts been confirmed as Justice O'Connor's replacement, Roberts would have held the distinction of being the first
person ever to have sat on the Court with the justice for whom he had
clerked.) Roberts is the second youngest person to be appointed as
Chief Justice and is the youngest person to have been nominated as
Chief Justice since John Marshall was nominated at the age of fortyfive in 1801. Appointed at the age of fifty as Chief Justice, Roberts
has a good chance of becoming one of the longest serving justices ever.
Third, the Roberts and Alito confirmation hearings were distinctive for what was not said publicly. When he was running for re-election, President George W. Bush promised to appoint "strict
constructionists" to the Court,8 though he never explained what he
meant by those terms. Before more than one audience of supporters,
the President left the impression that Justices Scalia and Thomas
would serve as models for his appointments, but he did not mention
either as a model at the time he nominated Roberts or Alito. Nor did
the President ever describe Roberts or Alito as a "strict constructionist." During their respective confirmation hearings, Roberts and Alito
refrained from describing themselves as "strict constructionists," and
none of the senators supporting their nominations described them as
"strict constructionists." Nor did the nominees or their supporters
suggest they were like, or in the mold of, Justice Scalia or Justice
Thomas. Chief Justice Roberts jokingly dismissed the comparisons. 9
Particularly conspicuous by its absence throughout the hearings
was any extended discussion of the nominees' judicial philosophy. In
the past, judicial nominees have gotten into trouble when they deConfirmation Hearing] (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy) (noting that Alito gave the
Judiciary Committee "platitudes about Supreme Court precedent and the
Constitution").
7. See id. at 573, 702-03 (statement of Sen. Tom Coburn) (noting Alito's great
'character" as well as the judgment of fellow judges, who know Alito's "heart").
8. The First Gore-Bush Presidential Debate, Oct. 3, 2000 (unofficial debate transcript, available at http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2000a.html).
9. See Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 2, at 378 (testimony of John G.
Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States) ("I will be my own man
on the Supreme Court. Period.").
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scribed themselves as originalists or as rigidly committed to original
meaning or neutral principles. Chief Justice Roberts explicitly refused to put a label on his approach to deciding cases. He rejected any
commitment to a "grand" theory of constitutional law requiring construing the Constitution in terms of a single unifying concept, such as
originalism.10 One looks in vain in Roberts' and Alito's confirmation
hearings for any description of them as "originalists" or as approaching cases in a manner like Justice Scalia or Justice Thomas. While a
few senators and
supportive witnesses described the nominees as
"conservative,"1 1 the label was left largely unexplained, 12 and most
supporting senators and witnesses studiously avoided labeling the
nominees at all.
Almost all the Republican senators on the Judiciary Committee
encouraged the nominees to refrain from answering questions about
specific issues remotely likely to come before them; and some cited
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg as a model for not answering specific
questions about what she would do if confirmed to the Court. 13 A few
senators went further. Some, such as Senator Mike DeWine, R.-Ohio,
suggested shortly after Alito's nomination that his confirmation would
help to bury the Senate's rejection of Bork as a precedent. Senator
Brownback, R.-Kansas, expressed pleasure with the nomination early
and often on the basis of the approach he expected Justice Alito to
follow in interpreting the Constitution.
It is easy to understand why the nominees and their supporters
had no incentive for discussing their judicial philosophies in detail.
With fifty Republicans in the Senate, President Bush had the numbers on his side: As long as most Republicans kept in line, his nominees were going to be confirmed. Only a really stupid blunder or
stupendous revelation might have derailed either nomination, but, not
surprisingly, neither occurred. Moreover, the possibility of a filibuster
was never serious. Earlier in the year, the so-called Gang of 14 in the
Senate had averted the "nuclear option" by agreeing not to allow any
judicial filibusters except in "extraordinary circumstances." A few Re10. See Roberts Confirmation Hearing,supra note 2, at 158 (testimony of John G.
Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States) ("Like most people, I
resist the labels ....
I prefer to be known as a modest judge.").
11. See Alito Confirmation Hearing,supra note 6, at 14, 748, 762 (statements of
Sen. Charles E. Grassley; Katherine L. Pringle, Partner, Friedman Kaplan Seiler &
Adelman, L.L.P, and Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz). See also Roberts Confirmation
Hearing,supra note 2, at 36, 40, 506, 512, 513 (statements of Sen. Lindsey 0. Graham;
Sen. Charles E. Schumer; Sen. Dianne Feinstein; and Peter B. Edelman, Professor of
Law, Georgetown University).
12. See, e.g., Alito Confirmation Hearing, supra note 6, at 1176-79 (statement of
Anthony Kronman, Sterling Professor of Law and Former Dean of Yale Law School).
13. See Roberts Confirmation Hearing,supra note 2, at 42 (statement of Sen. John
Cornyn) (encouraging Roberts not to abandon "the Ginsburg Standard").
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publican members of the Gang of 14 openly declared they did not believe either the Roberts or Alito nomination met their understanding
of the "extraordinary circumstances" required by the agreement for a
judicial filibuster. Consequently, any senators contemplating filibustering either nomination knew at the outset of the hearings they almost certainly lacked the requisite support to mount a successful
filibuster or to defeat the nuclear option. With the knowledge that a
judicial filibuster was extremely unlikely, Roberts and Alito erred on
the side of saying too little rather than too much in their respective
hearings. No nominee has ever been rejected for saying too little to
the Committee; Bork was a dramatic example of the problems a nominee could cause for himself by talking too much. The nominees made
themselves the smallest targets possible in their respective hearings,
and each succeeded.
Moreover, the nominees distanced themselves from the few potentially embarrassing public documents they wrote as Justice Department officials. They vowed to keep an "open mind"14 and dismissed
the potentially embarrassing (if not revealing) statements within
those documents as nothing more than the work of paid advocates.
They repeatedly distinguished their duties and responsibilities as Supreme Court justices from those they had as Justice Department lawyers. The distancing techniques helped to smooth their relative paths
toward confirmation, though they never erased the suspicion some observers had that the potentially troublesome documents were a significant reason for their selection as nominees.
The persistent refusals to address hypotheticals and to discuss judicial philosophy at length effectively shifted the burden of persuasion
to the opposition. Had the numbers in the Senate been different - say,
the Senate had been evenly divided or the Democrats had controlled
the Judiciary Committee - a different strategy might have been in order. But, with the numbers being what they were, the nominees could
not only afford to be reticent in answering questions but also expect
their reticence to place upon the Democrats the burden to demonstrate some lack of fitness to serve on the Court. Obviously, that burden was never met.
The final subject not discussed in any meaningful detail in the
Roberts and Alito proceedings was religion. Almost nothing was said
in the hearings about the possible relevance of the nominees' religion,
14. See Roberts Confirmation Hearing,supra note 2, at 56 (testimony of John G.
Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States) ("If I am confirmed, I will
confront every case with an open mind."). See also Alito Confirmation Hearing, supra
note 6, at 322 (testimony of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Nominee to be an Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States) (stating that he would approach questions
beyond that of stare decisis with an "open mind").
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either to their selections, or to their approaches to constitutional interpretation. (Interestingly, Jay Sekulow, who advised the White House
on the appointments of Roberts and Alito and who strongly supported
both nominations, published a book arguing that the best and most
courageous justices have been the ones who have allowed themselves
to be guided, in part, by their religious convictions. 15 ) Roberts and
Alito became the fourth and fifth Roman Catholics on the Court, respectively. The Roberts Court, at least in its first year, has had the
largest number of Roman Catholics ever to sit on the Court at one
time. The percentage of the Court that is Roman Catholic far exceeds
the percentage of Roman Catholics in the United States. More than a
few people may wonder whether it is a coincidence that all five Roman
Catholics on the Court - including Roberts and Alito - are Republican
appointees. Although some senators probably felt that questioning
nominees about their religious convictions or affiliations should have
no place in the confirmation process, others might have wondered
whether the nominees' religious commitments had any relevance to
their selection. Moreover, shortly after being nominated by President
Bush, Alito told one senator he thought that the Court had made a
mistake in not allowing more religion into public life. Yet, no senators
pressed Alito on the statement. The hearings left unclear whether
senators avoided questions about Alito's statement because they
agreed with him or because they feared that challenging Alito in this
area would have made him more, not less, sympathetic.
II.

EXPLAINING HARRIET MIERS

It is not possible to fully understand the significance of the confirmation proceedings that occurred from the beginning of July 2005
through January 2006 without explaining Harriet Miers. As we all
know, John Roberts and Samuel Alito, Jr., were not the only people
nominated by the President to replace Justice O'Connor. Roberts was
the first, Alito was the third, but Harriet Miers was the second. Miers'
nomination was unusual, not just because it failed, but also because it
provoked greater candor - more transparency, if you will - from the
White House and some Republican senators. Neither the rhetoric nor
the strategy employed on behalf of the nominations of Roberts and
Alito worked, or were used, for Miers. The White House's defense of
her nomination and its ultimate failure may clarify what the White
House and many senators may have been trying to obscure with the
appointments of Roberts and Alito.
15. See generally JAY ALAN SEKULOW, WITNESSING THEIR FAITH: RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE ON SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AND THEIR OPINIONS (2006).
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Miers' failure is mystifying because she is only the second Supreme Court nominee to be forced to be withdrawn during a period of
unified government. The last time a Supreme Court nomination
failed in a period of unified government was Abe Fortas' nomination
as Chief Justice. 16 It did not appear, at least at the time of the withdrawal of Miers' nomination, that she had the kinds of monumental
problems that brought Fortas down - a nomination by a lame duck
president, ethical lapses, demonstrated lack of judicial temperament,
and a filibuster. 17 Nor, for that matter, did she appear to have Fortas'
rather daunting credentials, including highly regarded Supreme
Court advocacy.' 8
I believe there were at least five reasons for the failure of Miers'
nomination to the Supreme Court. To begin with, it became a liability
for her not to measure up to Roberts. It was not just that she lacked
Roberts' elite credentials. Unlike Roberts (or Alito, later), she was not
well known among the conservative or political elite at the time of her
nomination to the Court. The people who knew her best were not in
the nation's Capitol but back home in Dallas, where she had practiced
law and become President of the Texas Bar. She had never appeared
on anyone's short list of Republican Supreme Court nominees,
whereas Roberts (and again, Alito, later) had appeared on virtually
every such list. The fact that neither Roberts nor Alito needed much,
if any, introduction to the Senate, worked to their benefit; whereas, it
worked against Miers that she had to be introduced to the public and
to those who were being asked to support her.
Secondly, Miers was hurt badly by the White House's initial defense of her nomination. The President's initial defense was that he
knew her "heart."19 In trying to sell her nomination to conservative
religious leaders, White House adviser Karl Rove stressed her religious faith.20 By the White House's own apparent admission, her religion appears to have been a factor in her selection as a nominee to the
Supreme Court. Conspicuously absent from the initial defense of her
nomination was any reference to a specific judicial philosophy or to
her professional accomplishments.
Commentators, as well as several senators, wasted no time in denouncing the White House's strategy. A loud and persistent chorus
16. Assessing Harriet Miers, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2005, at A22.
17. U.S. Senate: Art & History, Filibuster Derails Supreme Court Appointment,
http://www. senate. gov/artandhistorylhistory/minute/Filibuster_ Derails Supreme
CourtAppointment.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2007).
18. Michael A. Fletcher, White House Counsel Miers Chosen for Court; Some Question Her Lack of Experience as a Judge, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2005, at Al.
19. Id.
20. Peter Baker, White House Shifts Its Lobbying Strategy, WASH. POST, Oct. 15,
2005, at A7.
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reminded the White House that religion was not an appropriate basis
for any federal appointment, including a seat on the Supreme Court.
Indeed, the Constitution expressly forbids a religious test for a federal
appointment. It was hard for the White House to credibly deny that
religion had been a factor in its selection of her when White House
personnel spoke openly of her religious convictions in response to inquiries about her qualifications for the Court. It became harder still
when one of her key supporters, a Texas Supreme Court justice, tried
to put some conservative interest group leaders at ease by describing
the critical events culminating in her becoming an Evangelical Christian and his certitude about how her faith dictated how she would rule
21
on abortion rights questions on the Court.
If we look back at all four of President Bush's Supreme Court
nominations (Roberts twice, Miers, and Alito), we can see that at least
one thing they all share is a strong Christian faith. It is possible this
common link was not coincidental. President Bush, his advisers, and
many Repubican senators believe that the appointments of Sandra
Day O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter were mistakes
because these justices were not rigidly committed to the right kind of
judicial ideology. It is possible that President Bush and his advisers
considered a nominee's religious faith as pertinent insofar as it may
have constituted an inflexible anchor or foundation of their approach
to deciding cases as justices. It may not have been enough for President Bush or his advisers that prospective nominees espoused the
right kind of philosophy or even had long track records of service to
the party or commitment to the right kind of judging. Justices Kennedy and Souter had relatively long track records as judges and made
the right kinds of statements when screened for the Court, but both,
insofar as many conservatives are concerned, failed to fulfill their
promise as genuinely conservative justices. In their critics' judgment,
both justices proved susceptible to liberal influences. That Roberts,
Alito, and Miers may have espoused judicial philosophies that were
appealing to the White House may have mattered to their selection,
but their religious convictions, when coupled with their espoused ideological commitments, may have helped to clinch their nominations. At
the very least, those convictions probably made these nominees appealing to the various religious leaders who had publicly supported
President Bush's efforts to transform the federal courts, including the
sponsors of Justice Sunday I and II.

21. Michael Grunwald, Jo Becker, & John Pomfret, Strong Grounding in the
Church Could Be a Clue to Miers's Priorities,WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2005, at Al (discussing her belief that "life begins at conception").
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The third problem with the Miers nomination was that Miers
lacked the qualifications to serve on the Supreme Court. Nothing
could be done to rectify this deficiency. One could look at the r~sum6
of either Roberts or Alito and imagine that an appointment to the Supreme Court was a possible, logical, and natural next step for either or
both of them. One could not do the same for Miers. One could not look
at her r~sum6 and figure that a seat on the Supreme Court was the
next, logical step for her.
This is not an elitist judgment. It has nothing to do with where
she went to law school or with where she practiced law. (I hasten to
say that I like Dallas and SMU. My mother and brother live in Dallas,
and my father is buried there.) Miers' qualifications became suspect
from the outset because her professional experience was not the initial
basis on which the White House defended the nomination. Saying, in
effect, that her religion was her first qualification for serving on the
Supreme Court implied that Miers' other qualifications were secondary; and they may have been secondary because they could not, and
did not, speak for themselves. Miers was a Managing Partner of a
major Dallas law firm, but it is not entirely clear how that translates
into qualifying her for a seat on the Supreme Court. Nor had she litigated, much less argued, major cases before the Supreme Court - indeed, the Court had never been the focus of her professional work.
Even worse for Miers, she badly flubbed her interviews with senators. Meetings with senators were especially important for Miers because, as an unknown commodity, she had to sell herself. Yet, more
than a few senators found her underwhelming. She could not answer
some basic questions. For instance, she had a hard time telling Senator Leahy who her favorite justice was 2 2 - not a hard question, given
that it is asked to virtually every Supreme Court nominee and some
answers - Justices John Marshall Harlan the Younger - are safer
than others. Her choice - Warren Burger - was odd, at best, because
he is not usually on people's lists of favorite justices. Even Miers had
a hard time explaining her choice. Worst of all, Senator Arlen Specter, the Chair of the Judiciary Committee, acknowledged that Miers3
2
needed "a crash course in constitutional law" before the hearings.
This was not an auspicious start, to stay the least.
Imagine someone interviewing with a Board of Directors to be the
CEO of a company. If that person needs a "crash course" on what the
company does before she can answer its questions, that person had
22. Michael A. Fletcher & Shailagh Murray, Warren? Or Burger?A Matter of Judgment, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2005, at A4.
23. 151 CONG. REC. S11953 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 2005) (statement of Sen. Arlen
Spector).
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better like her current job. She stands no chance of being selected to
run the company. The same was true of Miers. She could not make
the case for her own appointment.
Another problem with the Miers nomination was the fact that she
lacked a demonstrable commitment to the kind of judicial ideology
that many Republican senators (and conservative interest group leaders) desired for Justice O'Connor's replacement. Some senators were
openly skeptical of Miers' judicial philosophy. 24 Without a long history in the conservative movement or of championing conservative judicial decisions, Miers was a wild card for these senators. The support
for her nomination among the conservative elite (and the President's
core constituents) weakened when the press published some liberalsounding statements she had made as the Texas Bar President. 25
President Bush's assurances did not alleviate the concerns of many of
his supporters about her position on abortion rights, school prayer,
and all the other matters likely to come before her on the Court.
A final reason Miers' nomination failed is that the President simply did a poor job of vetting her nomination. In nominating her, he
had made the mistake of deviating from the thorough vetting he had
required for every other prospective nominee. If he figured that his
vouching for her would be a sufficient safeguard against any surprising revelations, he was wrong. He - or his staff - failed to learn the
painful lesson to be derived from President Reagan's nomination of
Douglas Ginsburg to the Court. In a rush to nominate someone in the
wake of the Senate's rejection of Robert Bork, President Reagan did
not wait for the usual background check before nominating Douglas
Ginsburg to the Court. Ginsburg was forced to withdraw from consideration just nine days after the President had nominated him to the
Court because of embarrassing revelations about drug use that had
not up until that moment become public or known within the administration. Miers lasted a little longer than nine days, but it is possible
had more people been consulted or more people been given the opportunity to ensure the soundness of the President's preference, Miers
might either have not been nominated or she would have been nominated with a better strategy to secure confirmation.

24. See Michael A. Fletcher & Charles Babington, Conservatives Escalate Opposition to Miers; Web Sites and Ad Campaign Seek Nominee's Withdrawal, WASH. POST,
Oct. 25, 2005, at A2. See also Press Release, Rep. Lois Capps, Congresswoman Capps'
Statement on Nomination of Harriet Miers for U.S. Supreme Court (Oct. 3, 2005) (on
file with author), available at httpJ/www.house.govlist/press/ca23_capps/pr051003miers.html.
25. Jo Becker & Sylvia Moreno, Miers Backed Race, Gender Set-Asides; Nominee
Made Diversity a Texas State Bar Goal, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2005, at A5.
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With so many problems, one is left to wonder why Miers was nominated to the Court. Her nomination is all the more confounding because the stated reason for the withdrawal - the concern that
executive privilege would prevent her from answering questions posed
by Judiciary Committee members about her work as Chief White
House Counsel - was easily foreseeable before she was ever
26
nominated.
I seriously doubt that the President nominated Miers with the intention of withdrawing her nomination soon thereafter. It is hard to
imagine a president willingly squandering a Supreme Court nomination. It seems especially unlikely that this President would have
squandered the nomination given how much it meant to him and his
party. Nor, for that matter, was it a sure thing that Miers' nomination
would have failed. Given that the Minority Leader Harry Reid had
suggested the nomination to the President, 2 7 many Democrats might
have viewed her as the best for which they could hope, and some
Republicans would have deferred to the President's choice.
I have no inside information, and can only speculate about the
reasons for Miers' nomination. My guess is that she was the woman
candidate who was most acceptable to President Bush. Before the
President nominated Miers to replace Justice O'Connor, he had nominated John Roberts twice - first to fill Justice O'Connor's seat and
second to fill the seat vacated because of Chief Justice Rehnquist's
death. At that point, the President could not turn to a John Roberts
again. Turning to another white man might not have been politically
wise. The additional problem was that there were not a lot of women
who were both "strict constructionists" and had the credentials of a
John Roberts. There might have been some women - Judge Edith
Jones, for example - who had the right kind of judicial ideology but
were nevertheless quite controversial; and there might have been
some women - Maureen Mahoney, for instance - who had stellar credentials but supposedly did not have the kind of judicial ideology preferred by the White House. (Apparently, Mahoney's successful
defense of the University of Michigan's affirmative action program in
the Supreme Court was widely viewed as a negative among those responsible for judicial selection in the Bush administration.) And, of
course, whoever the President chose had to be confirmable. Thus,
from the President's perspective, Miers had an edge: He believed she
had the right kind of judicial philosophy and that she could be confirmed with relative ease. The fact that she did not have a paper trail
as an ideologue was, from his perspective, a strength, not a weakness.
26.
27.

The Letter of Withdrawal, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2005, at A7.
The President's Choice, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2005, at A22.
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If none of that were enough, President Bush had an added incentive of
hoisting the Democrats on their own petard because Minority Leader
Senator Harry Ried had suggested Miers' nomination to the President. Recall the silence - maybe, it was discomfort - of Democrats
during the short period in which she was the President's nominee. We
do not know what Democrats would have done had they been forced to
vote on her nomination.
This is all pure speculation. Without the White House's records
(which will not be public for many years), we need to be careful about
reaching any conclusions about the reasons for Miers' failed nomination. We only know a part of the story. The part we know seems to
put some blame on the President for not employing the same process
for vetting her nomination that he had used for other possible nominees. Had he done so, the story goes, Miers would have made it
through. But, based on what we know, much of the blame for the failure of the Miers nomination goes to Miers herself. It was unusual, to
say the least, that with the President's party in charge, Miers could
not command enough support to keep her nomination viable until she
could at least make an appearance before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Her withdrawal of her nomination to the Court was one of the
fastest in history. The twenty-four-hour news cycle and the Internet,
no doubt, contributed to the swiftness of her fall as a Supreme Court
nominee. Moreover, the swiftness of Miers' fall may tell us something
about the strengths of her nomination - namely, that it had few. She
did not have enough going for her to outweigh the doubts and negatives cropping up shortly after nomination. The few strengths of the
nomination could not make up for what Miers lacked professionally
and ideologically.
III.

THE HEARINGS AS PRECEDENT

The remaining question is what the confirmation proceedings for
Roberts, Miers, and Alito portend for the future of the Supreme Court
selection process. More than once during the hearings for Roberts and
Alito, senators cited some past proceedings as possible precedents.
Roberts declared shortly after being sworn in as Chief Justice that he
construed his confirmation as demonstrating the Senate's approval of
judging as distinct from politics. 28 Some senators suggested Alito's
confirmation set an important precedent for the appointment of justices with "conservative" judicial philosophies to the Court. It is not
entirely clear why this should be so, given that Alito never described
28. Associated Press, John Roberts Sworn in as 17th Chief Justice, Sept. 29, 2005,
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9521047.
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his philosophy as "liberal' or "conservative" and many senators refrained from labeling his jurisprudence.
Whatever happened during the confirmation proceedings for Alito, Miers, and Roberts, the likelihood is that their significance will
depend much more on how senators subsequently describe the proceedings than on what senators said or did at the time. In spite of all
the efforts at orchestration, it is already apparent they could be construed in at least several ways.
First, the appointments of Roberts and Alito extend the trend of
appointing sitting judges to the Court. Each of the last ten appointees
to the Court was a sitting judge prior to his or her appointment. The
last time there was a successful Supreme Court nominee without judicial experience was 1971, the year in which President Nixon nominated Lewis Powell and William Rehnnquist to the Court. Miers
would have been the first person, since Powell and Rehnquist, to come
to the Court from a position other than a sitting judgeship. That she
failed could be taken as further evidence of the importance of prior
judicial experience as an important prerequisite for a successful appointment to the Court. It is likely many key decision-makers feel
that the distinction between judging and politics is best appreciated
by people who have been judges, though most Supreme Court appointees were not judges prior to their appointments to the Court. A track
record as a judge may have become, at least for many people, the best
evidence of their appreciation of what judges ought to do. I share,
with some others, the belief that some of our most distinguished justices - Charles Evans Hughes, for example - could appreciate not only
the distinctive responsibilities of judging but also the special challenges confronting other constitutional actors.
A second way to construe the Supreme Court confirmation proceedings during 2005 and 2006 is establishing yet another precedent
for the pertinence of politics and judicial ideology in the nomination
and confirmation of justices. Prior to 2005, all but 17 of the 147 nominees for positions on the Supreme Court belonged to the same political
party as the president at the time of nomination. All three of President Bush's nominees were Republicans (though Miers once had not
been); and President Bush's two successful nominees were both
Republicans and both had served as political appointees in Republican
administrations.
Moreover, judicial philosophy was an obvious factor in his choice
of nominees. It was not merely coincidence that he interviewed and
ultimately selected as nominees people who had demonstrated - in
some way - a record of commitment to the preferred judicial philosophy. For their part, senators clearly took judicial ideology into ac-
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count in voting on Roberts and Alito. Lee Epstein and Jeffrey Segal
determined that, prior to 2005, "senators are most likely to vote for
nominees who are ideologically close to them and least likely to vote
for nominees who are ideologically distant from them. ..."29 This pattern held true in the Roberts and Alito hearings; twenty-two senators
voted against Roberts on purely ideological grounds, while forty-two
voted against Alito on such grounds. It is possible a few senators Ben Nelson and Arlen Specter, for instance - may have voted for the
nominees in spite of their likely judicial ideologies, and possibly because of possible shifts in their own ideological positions. Of the seventy-eight senators voting for Roberts and the fifty-eight voting for
Alito, it's not hard to see that statements made in these or other hearings (and circumstances) reflect their ideological proximity to the
nominees.
The confirmation proceedings further confirmed Epstein's and Segal's finding that "Senators will most certainly vote for candidates
who are ideologically close and well qualified, and they also will almost certainly vote against candidates who are distant and not qualified." 30 Strong qualifications clearly make it harder - but not
impossible - for senators to vote against nominees with stellar credentials. It is possible that if there were a few more Democrats in the
Senate, Alito might have faced some serious trouble in the confirmation process. Whether he would have suffered a fate like Bork's is impossible to know. At least thus far, Bork is that rare nominee whose
stellar credentials could not move enough senators from their preferred ideological positions to approve him in spite of the undeniable
transformative potential of his appointment.
One thing to keep in mind is that while Alito replaced O'Connor,
who had been a swing vote in so many cases, Justice Anthony Kennedy is now the Court's swing justice. As someone who voted to reaffirm Roe v.Wade 31 and to overturn Bowers v. Hardwick3 2 in Lawrence v. Texas,3 3 Justice Kennedy is not a model for the Bush White
House or most Republican senators. If Justice Stevens or any other
justice on the supposedly "liberal" wing leaves the Court, the balance
of the Court will be as much at stake as it was when Kennedy replaced
Lewis Powell. This alone will make the next hearings excruciatingly
intense for Democrats and Republicans. If the next vacancy were to
29.

LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDI-

109 (2005).
30. Id. at 114.
31. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
32. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003).
33. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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arise in a time of divided government, the fight over the nomination
within the Senate will be all the more intense. It is hard to imagine
that either Republicans or Democrats will be indifferent to the nominee's likely judicial ideology at such a time. More to the point, would
Republican senators treat a Democratic president's Supreme Court
nominee the same as they treated either Roberts or Alito, especially if
they knew the ideological balance of the Court were at stake?
Nor can we overlook the significance of the consultations between
presidents and senators prior to the selection of Supreme Court nominees. The pre-nomination consultation is a significant way by which
to filter out nominees with unacceptable judicial philosophies. Prior
to President Bush's selection of Roberts as his nominee to replace Justice O'Connor, he received recommendations from most senators. He
received recommendations from more than seventy senators before he
chose Miers and Alito. One of the factors used by President Bush to
narrow his selection was judicial philosophy, and every senator knew
that. It is disingenuous for anyone to say that Roberts or Alito were
picked without any consideration of his judicial philosophy; the focus
just occurred prior to the formal announcement of the nomination.
The fact that the confirmation process operates more smoothly, or
more seemly, when the focus on judicial philosophy occurs in a less
public phase of the process does not mean that key decision-makers
have ignored judicial philosophy.
A third way to construe the Senate's approvals of Roberts and Alito is as a precedent for emphasizing nominees' moral character and
not their judicial philosophies. For this construction to work, the references to nominees' "heart" and "character" have to be understood as
referring to something specific about the nominees - namely, that
their characters were somehow morally distinctive. Prior to these
hearings, some constitutional scholars urged the Senate to focus on
nominees' moral character rather than their likely judicial philosophies. As these scholars (and the senators who agree with them) will
tell you, this focus has several supposed advantages over an emphasis
on nominees' judicial philosophies: It supposedly would keep senators
from interfering with the independence of each nominee to retain his
or her discretion to decide cases or controversies free from political
pressure or political retaliation. Furthermore, moral character has
the advantage of being constant; no matter what cases arise in the
future - and it is difficult if not impossible to predict the kinds of cases
likely to arise decades from now - we can expect that the justices will
retain their morally distinctive characters over time. Moral character
is important because the moral authority of each justice is instrumental to fostering public respect for what he or she decides. Indeed, the
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supposition is that justices earn respect for their decisions by virtue of
their moral characters, not by the force of their reasoning.
The focus on nominees' moral character is, however, potentially
problematic in several respects. The first is that senators may not be
sincere in discussing a nominee's "heart" or "character." The references could be either subterfuge or misleading. The President and
others may have opted for a discussion of "heart" or "character" as a
means to signal what the nominees would do without having to discuss their judicial philosophies in specific terms. A disturbing development over the last several years is the emergence of a code or secret
language to convey what justices may do. Presidents and senators do
not need to openly discuss certain attributes of nominees if these are
already known or may be conveyed by other means. But, it is hard to
see how this signaling helps the process; it merely forces people construing the significance of the events to dig deeper for answers rather
than to stop looking for them. The primary relevance of the discussion
of Miers' religion and "heart" may have been that they were meant to
convey something about her fitness to serve on the Court, that she had
the kind of judicial ideology we might expect someone with her "heart"
and "character" to have.
The second problem with construing the hearings as a precedent
for emphasizing nominees' moral characters is that it undercuts the
claim made by some senators that the hearings should be considered
as a different kind of precedent - namely, one standing for the Senate's confirming "conservative" justices. The problem is senators cannot have it both ways: They cannot claim the irrelevance of the
nominees' judicial philosophies as a basis for their confirmation while
at the same time arguing that their confirmations actually established
precedents for confirming justices with particular judicial
philosophies.
Third, construing Roberts' and Alito's confirmations will constitute a precedent for primarily focusing on nominees' moral character
only if a similar focus can be maintained in a time of divided government as well. Moral character ought not to be the monopoly of either
of the major parties. If it were not a basis for approving justices nominated by presidents of both parties, it would lose any claim to neutrality, and it cannot claim to be a principled focus if it only works to the
advantage of one party's nominees.
Fourth, there is substantial uncertainty and lack of consensus
over what constitutes the requisite moral character for the Court. To
be sure, there is a lot to be said about Supreme Court justices meeting
exacting standards of integrity and temperament. But, focusing on
moral character could become problematic if there were no clear stan-
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dard. The challenge for senators is to define beforehand their preferred moral character for the Court, not to make up the requisite
qualities as they go along. Moreover, judging does not depend solely
on moral character. Presumably, we want nominees with first-rate
legal credentials, with the right kinds of skills and temperament.
Moral character might be one, but hardly the only, appropriate factor
to consider in confirmation proceedings.
The final problem with focusing on nominees' moral character is
that the claim that justices command public respect because of their
moral character may not be empirically sound. Most Americans still
do not know the names of most justices, much less accurate information about their respective character. Public respect for the Court
may not depend on the justices' character. Instead, it is possible that
the justices' moral character may be more important to cultivating the
respect of the leaders of other public institutions than it is for ensuring the public's respect for what the Court does.
Most troubling about construing these recent appointments as
precedents is, however, allowing religion to be taken into account as a
basis of selection. The explicit references to Miers' nomination were
disturbing because the Constitution expressly forbids using a religious
test for federal appointment. The references were hard to square with
the White House's repeated assurances that Roberts' Roman Catholic
faith and his wife's work for Catholic pro-life organizations were irrelevant to his selection. For many, the references to Miers' faith signaled an inappropriate mixing of church and state; the references
confirmed the possibility that Miers and perhaps Alito and Roberts
were chosen in part because of, rather than in spite of, their respective
religious convictions.
It is not hard to imagine why the White House may have considered Miers' and perhaps other nominees' religious faiths pertinent.
We know the White House wanted, perhaps more than anything else,
to nominate justices who would not "evolve" on the Court, as supposedly O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy had done. They wanted people
who would decide cases on the basis of judicial philosophies that
would not change over time. Saying the "right thing" in interviews
with the President or other executive officials, and even performing on
the lower courts in a manner agreeable to the White House, was not
good enough. The Bush White House wanted someone whose judicial
philosophy was both predictable and durable. The nominees' religious
convictions may have been at least as pertinent as heart or character
as the inflexible, immutable anchors of their judicial philosophies.
Forcing Miers' withdrawal does not necessarily establish a precedent against explicitly considering nominees' religious convictions as a
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basis for their selection. Her forced withdrawal may simply be a lesson to maintain the practice with greater secrecy to do so below radar,
so to speak.
It remains to be demonstrated, as an empirical matter, what the
respect for the Court from either the public or other branches really
depends on. In this day and age, it seems that many political leaders
have difficulty acknowledging the possibility of principled differences
among the justices. Far too often, public leaders denounce any opinion or decision with which they disagree as grounded on political, or
partisan, grounds. The effort to focus on the moral character of Supreme Court nominees may well have the salutary effect of reducing
explicit consideration of nominees' judicial philosophy, but it is naive
to think judicial philosophy was irrelevant to either their nominations
or their confirmations.
I cannot close without discussing another possible precedent set
by the Roberts and Alito appointments. Roberts and Alito have something else in common with Justices Thomas and Scalia other than religion. Like Scalia and Thomas, Roberts and Alito were political
appointees in Republican administrations. Indeed, Roberts, Alito,
Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist were all political appointees in
the Justice Department, and all were evidently involved in making a
number of politically charged decisions at the Justice Department.
They were all political appointees in the Justice Department chosen at times when the only people picked as judges or justices had to
have the right kinds of credentials and ideological convictions. There
was every sign, well before the appointments of any of these justices,
they were true believers in a constitutional vision, and there was
nothing to suggest that any had ceased to be at the time of appointment. Charles Fried, who was the Solicitor General under whom both
Alito and Roberts once worked, quipped that he was confident there
34
was not a dime's worth of difference in their judicial philosophies.
One wonders what the basis for his confidence is. More than a few
documents that Alito and Roberts produced working at the Justice Department (and, in Roberts' case, the White House counsel's office) reflect the kind of approach to constitutional interpretation that
President Bush clearly favors. One can only imagine what other documents that were not produced might demonstrate about the constitutional philosophies and commitments of Roberts and Alito.
Once the Bush White House records become public, we might discover that the apparent emphasis on nominees' religion mattered but
34. Jeffrey Rosen, Alito vs. Roberts, Word by Word, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, §4,
at 1 (quoting Charles Fried as saying, "I don't think there's a great deal of daylight
between Alito and Roberts on privacy.").
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not as much as the work product these nominees produced while
working as political appointees in the Justice Department. In fact,
their appointments extend the precedent of appointing people whose
constitutional opinions became known while working as political appointees in the Justice Department. It is possible, if not likely, that
middle-level officials, as Roberts and Alito were, were encouraged and
rewarded for pushing the constitutional philosophies they shared with
the President and others in the Reagan and Bush administrations. It
is well known that the Justice Department became highly politicized
at the time Roberts and Alito worked there as political appointees.
Moreover, the Justice Department, in those days and since, was a
feeder for federal judgeships. It was not just happenstance that Roberts and Alito were nominated by President Bush's father to the federal courts of appeal. (Recall Roberts was first nominated as a judge to a seat on the D.C. Circuit-by President Bush's father.) He was
trying to extend the practice, begun under President Reagan, of transforming the federal courts. The tough screening of prospective nominees ensured that the only people who merited judicial appointments
had to have proven their ideological commitments in demonstrable
ways. The Judicial Department was an ideal place to demonstrate
such commitments.
CONCLUSION
I hope, like so many people did during those uncomfortable moments when the White House seemed to exult over Harriet Miers' religious convictions, that religion is not a pertinent criterion for judicial
selection. I suspect that strong religious convictions may have been
more than a coincidental link connecting Roberts, Miers, and Alito. I
suspect that the objective in President Bush's searches for Supreme
Court nominees was evidence of being a true believer, by which I
mean someone with a fervent, unshakeable conviction in how the Constitution ought to be interpreted in every case. Service in the Justice
Department, particularly in highly sensitive political posts, may turn
out to be good evidence of true belief. It may turn out, once the Bush
White House's records become public, that the new religion that matters for elevation to the nation's highest Court is fervent service to the
cause and not just to the party.
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